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FLORIDA TAKEOVER LAW: AFFILIATED
TRANSACTIONS
JEFFERY M. FULLER* AND ROBERT C. RASMUSSEN**
Many states perceive corporate takeover activity as a threat to local
business and industry. The Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute is
one part of a comprehensive scheme of anti-takeover regulation in
Florida. The authors of this Article explain the development of
American takeover regulation, analyze this statute, and discuss
surrounding constitutional and public policy issues.
T HE AVALANCHE of state regulation of hostile takeovers under
the guise of corporate governance has obstructed the course of cor-
porate takeover activity.' The United States Supreme Court upheld an
Indiana takeover law in 1987.2 Since then, numerous states have enacted
legislation designed to thwart hostile takeovers of in-state companies
and protect local labor and markets.'
Florida has adopted a four-prong approach to protect local industry
against hostile takeovers. Section 607.109, Florida Statutes, regulates the
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1. See Hackl & Testani, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder
Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193 (1988) (empirical evidence indicates that second
generation state takeover statutes deter takeover attempts and reduce the likelihood of a success-
ful acquisition).
2. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644-48, 1652 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Arizona: Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201 to -1223 (Supp. 1989); Delaware:
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); Florida: FLA. STAT. §§ 607.108-.111 (1989); Louis-
iana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to :140.2 (West Supp. 1990); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. chs. I IOD, IIOF (West 1990); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302.A.601-.673
(West Supp. 1989); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015, .295, .407, .410-.459, .690 (Vernon
1987 & Supp. 1990); Nevada: NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.378 (1987); North Carolina: N.C. GEN.
STAT. art. 55-9, -9A (1990); Washington: WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.50.010-.50.901 (Supp. 1988).
Delaware's takeover law has withstood constitutional attack. See BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 783
F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del. 1988); RP
Acquisition Corp. v. Stanley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988). Nearly half the
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 56% of all "Fortune 500" companies
are domiciled in Delaware. 11 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) 26 (1989). Thus,
because state takeover laws that apply to foreign corporations are probably unconstitutional, see
infra text accompanying notes 128-35, Delaware takeover law will figure prominently in American
takeover activity.
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acquisition of corporate control.4 Section 607.108 regulates the exercise
of corporate control.' Sectioh 607.111(9) authorizes directors to consider
nonshareholder interests in discharging their duties, thus giving incum-
bent management additional ammunition to justify an anti-takeover po-
sition. 6 Section 607.058 authorizes Florida corporations to issue "poison
pills"-stock rights and options designed to dilute the value of shares
acquired in hostile takeovers. 7 Constitutional issues in this statutory
scheme remain uncertain. Aside from those issues, however, Florida
takeover law presents a formidable challenge to hostile bids for control
of local corporations and provides these corporations with an imposing
arsenal to combat corporate raiders.'
This Article focuses on the Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute,9
the prong which regulates the exercise of corporate control. After exam-
ining federal and state takeover legislation, the Article discusses judicial
responses to state takeover laws. The Article also examines this statute
and identifies interpretative problems. The Article concludes by analyz-
ing constitutional issues and public policy considerations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Takeover Law
In 1968, Congress responded to perceived abuses in unregulated cash
tender offers by enacting the Williams Act, 10 which amended sections 13
4. FLA. STAT. § 607.109 (1989). Basically, voting rights of shares acquired in transactions
that bring stock ownership above certain thresholds are conditioned on special approval by disin-
terested shareholders or managment. See id.
5. Id. § 607.108. Basically, shareholders meeting certain ownership requirements may not
engage in certain transactions with the corporation. See id. The prohibited transactions are vari-
ous ways of combining with the corporation or obtaining more control; the statute is aimed at
acquirers who buy control of a corporation at one price and then "squeeze out" the remaining
shareholders at a lower price. See infra notes 137-64 and accompanying text.
6. Id. § 607.111(9).
7. Id. § 607.058. The validity of "poison pills" is uncertain in some jurisdictions. Compare
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (directors who adopted "poison pill"
preferred stock protected by business judgment rule) with West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley
Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1988) and Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp.
1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
8. The Florida Investor Protection Act was Florida's first takeover law. See ch. 77-441, § I-
8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1804-08 (repealed 1979). For a discussion of that law, see Louv, Developments
in Florida Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, 32 U. MIau L. REv. 931 (1978); Rasmussen
& Fuller, Florida Takeover Law: Control-Share Acquisitions, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv. 103, 109-110
(1988).
9. FLA. STAT. § 607.108 (1989). Effective July 1, 1990, there will be a major renumbering of
the Florida corporate code, with this statute renumbered 607.0901. See id. § 607.0901. All cita-
tions are to the pre-July numbering system.
For a structurally similar analysis of Florida's control share acquisition statute, see Rasmus-
sen & Fuller, supra note 8.
10. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)).
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and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 Congress extended the
coverage of the Williams Act in 1970 to include tender offers in which
shareholders of the target corporation receive securities in exchange for
their shares. 2 Thus, the Williams Act regulates tender offers for shares
of a target corporation in which the tendering shareholders receive cash,
securities, or a combination of cash and securities.
Neither the Williams Act nor the regulations thereunder define the
term "tender offer." Courts interpret the term to mean a public invita-
tion to all shareholders of a corporation to tender shares at a specified
price.' 3 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed
eight factors for use in determining whether an acquisition is a tender
offer: (1) active and widespread solicitation of shareholders; (2) solici-
tation of a substantial percentage of the stock; (3) offer to purchase at
a premium; (4) firm offer terms; (5) contingency of offer on the tender
of a fixed percentage of shares; (6) limited duration of offer; (7) pres-
sure on shareholders to sell; and (8) public announcements of a pur-
chasing program preceding or accompanying rapid accumulation of
stock. 4 The Williams Act was intended to protect investors confronted
with tender offers." It does so by imposing procedural safeguards and
requiring potential acquirers to provide ample time and information
for investors to evaluate tender offers.
11. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. (West
1981 & Supp. 1990)); see S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhfIN. NEws 2811-14. Only Virgi-
nia had a takeover statute when Congress enacted the Williams Act. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 631 n.6 (1982) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-528 (1978) (effective March 5, 1968);
Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42
Omo ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981)).
12. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(1) (1988)).
13. See generally E. ARANow & H. EIwHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70
(1973). See Mathews, The Elusive Definition of a Tender Offer, 7 J. CORP. L. 503 (1982); Note,
The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1973); Note, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 54
ST. JoHN's L. RE. 520 (1980).
14. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Branscan Ltd. v.
Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing criteria from Securities
and Exchange Commission's amicus curiae brief).
15. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,
422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (Congress enacted the Williams Act to "insure that public shareholders
who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without
adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party."); S. REP.
No. 550, supra note 11, at 3-4; see also H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 11, at 2-4. Senator
Williams stated: "This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the
Federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when
persons seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer ..... 113 CONG. REc. 854
(1967).
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Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act regulates both negotiated and
open-market purchases of stock. A person who acquires beneficial
ownership of more than five percent of any class of equity security
registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act must file a dis-
closure document with the SEC and target corporation within 10 days
after the last acquisition. 16 Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act regulates
tender offers. A person who makes a "tender offer" that will result in
the person beneficially owning more than five percent of any class of
equity security registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act
must file a similar disclosure document with the SEC and the target
corporation "as soon as practicable on the date of the commencement
of the tender offer."17
Although essentially a disclosure statute, the Williams Act does im-
pose substantive limitations on tender offers. A tender offer must be
open to all shareholders and treat all shareholders equally.' 8 A tender
offer must remain open for at least twenty business days.19 A tendering
shareholder may withdraw tendered shares at any time while the tender
offer remains open and, if the offeror has not purchased the shares, at
any time after the sixtieth day following the commencement of the
tender offer.20 If the shareholders tender more shares than the offeror
will accept, the offeror must purchase the tendered shares on a pro
rata basis. 2' The offeror must pay the same price, that is, the highest
price offered for any of the tendered shares, for all the shares pur-
chased pursuant to the tender offer.2
Since the enactment of the Williams Act, observers have argued
about the precise nature of its "investor protection." According to one
theory, the Williams Act embraces a "market approach" to the regula-
tion of corporate takeovers and provides a framework within which
market forces can function freely and openly; thus, a state takeover
statute that upsets the congressionally selected "neutral balance '2 3 be-
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, -101 (1989).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-3 (1989).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988) (section 14(e) of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)
(1989). However, acquirers may offer different packages if shareholders may elect among them.
Also, acquirers may exclude shareholders in certain states or offer them different consideration if
necessitated by state law. Id. § 14d-10(b)-(d).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1988) (section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-
1 (a) (1989).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988) (section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F R. §§
240.14d-7, .14e-l(a) (1989).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1989).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988) (section 14(d)(7) of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-10 (1989).
23. The Senate committee stated that it took "extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of
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tween management and the tender offeror frustrates the objectives of
the Williams Act.24 According to an opposing theory, the Williams
Act's policy of neutrality does not prohibit states from upsetting that
neutrality if the objective is increased shareholder protection .2 These
competing theories have influenced decisions such as Edgar v. MITE
Corp.26 and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.27
B. State Takeover Laws
States began to regulate tender offers when the Williams Act was
adopted .2  During the ten-year period following the passage of the Wil-
liams Act, thirty-seven states enacted laws regulating tender offers.2 9
These "first generation" state takeover laws focused on the tender of-
fer phase of the takeover process but departed from the Williams Act
in important respects. First, state takeover laws generally imposed pre-
commencement filing requirements that would delay the commence-
ment of a tender offer.30 Second, those laws gave state officials broad
discretionary powers, such as the right to require disclosure of infor-
mation not required by the Williams Act3 and the right to determine
the fairness of a tender offer.32 Some first generation state takeover
regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid" and
drafted the legislation "to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the
same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case."
S. REp. No. 550, supra note , at 3.
24. For a discussion of the "market approach," see Note, A Failed Experiment: State Take-
over Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 459-62 [hereinafter Note,
A Failed Experiment]; see also Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland
Takes a New Tack, 83 MIcH. L. Rav. 433, 452-54 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Maryland Takes a
New Tack]; Comment, Minnesota's Corporate Takeover and Shareholder Protection Act of 1987:
Economic Folly or Constitutional Viability-Or Both?, 11 HAMUNE L. REv. 281, 293-95 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644-48,
1652 (1987).
26. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (discussed infra notes 61-84 and accompanying text).
27. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (discussed infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text).
28. For a general overview of the history of state takeover laws, see Block, Barton & Roth,
State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation," 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 332 (1986); Pinto, Take-
over Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. Ms.uan L. REv.
473 (1987); Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40
Bus. LAW. 671 (1985); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FoRtDwA L. Rav. 1 (1976).
29. See Note, A Failed Experiment, supra note 24, at 457 n.4.
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.355(1) (1977) (required the filing of a disclosure statement
with the Florida Division of Securities at the time of commencing a tender offer); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54.A (1979) (required 20 days prior written notice of terms of offer).
31. See FLA. STAT. § 517.355(2)(a) (1977).
32. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57.A, .E (1979). The Illinois statute
empowered the Secretary of State to conduct a fairness hearing to determine whether the offerees
in the tender offer would receive full and fair disclosure and to enjoin a tender offer if the state's
requirements were not satisfied. Id.
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laws applied to foreign corporations and nonresident shareholders.33 In
1982, the United States Supreme Court held an Illinois takeover law
unconstitutional as an indirect burden on interstate commerce,34 and
lower courts began to invalidate other state takeover laws."
Many state legislatures, including Florida's, responded by repealing
their takeover laws or amending them to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.3 6 Generally, second-generation state takeover laws apply to a
takeover only if (1) some nexus exists between the target corporation
and the regulating state, and (2) the takeover results in the acquisition
of a specified percentage of the voting power of the target corpora-
tion.37 Second-generation state takeover laws typically fit into two
broad categories: (1) "control-share acquisition" laws, which require
approval of voting rights by a target corporation's shareholders or
board of directors for an acquisition of a specified percentage of the
target corporation's securities; and (2) "fair price/business combina-
tion" laws, which prohibit or impose significant restrictions on statu-
torily specified business transactions with shareholders who control
more than a specified percentage of the voting power.3" The business
combination statutes are directed at "two-step front-end-loaded" tak-
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.351(7) (1977) (applied to any corporation incorporated in
Florida or having its principal place of business within Florida); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
para. 137.52-10 (1979) (applied to a tender offer to shareholders of a foreign corporation if the
target corporation had at least ten percent of its shareholders resident in Illinois or satisfied any
two of the following three conditions: (a) its principal executive office was located in Illinois; (b) it
was organized under Illinois law; or (c) ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus was
represented in Illinois).
34. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Okla-
homa Take-Over Bid Act violates commerce clause); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th
Cir. 1983) (Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act violates commerce clause); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan Take-Over Offers Act violates
commerce clause); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri
Takeover Bid Disclosure Act violates both the commerce clause and supremacy clause). Many
state takeover laws had been invalidated before MITE under both the commerce clause and su-
premacy clause. See Note, Maryland Takes a New Tack, supra note 24, at 440 n.44. Only the
Massachusetts takeover law withstood judicial scrutiny. See Agency Rent-A-Car v. Connolly, 686
F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982). Unpredictably, the Massachusetts takeover law was later declared un-
constitutional based on the Court's decision in CTS. See Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly,
839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988).
36. See, e.g., Law of October 1, 1977, ch. 77-441, §§ 1-8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1804-08 (repealed
1979); see Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation State Takeover Statutes-A New
Life For State Regulation, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 222 (1988); see also Pinto, supra note 28, at
478-83 (discussing various kinds of takeover laws enacted in response to MITE); Sargent, supra
note 11; Note, Maryland Takes a New Tack, supra note 24, at 441.
37. Comment, supra note 24, at 290.
38. Id. at 290. Courts and commentators classify state takeover laws in a variety of ways.
See Pinto, supra note 28, at 478-83 (identifying shareholder approval, second-tier, share redemp-
tion, fiduciary duty, and full disclosure models of takeover statutes).
AFFILIATED TRANSACTIONS
eovers, in which a tender offer at a very high price is followed by ac-
quisition of the remaining shares, by any of numerous methods, at a
lower price.
C. Judicial Response to State Takeover Laws
Judicial challenges to state anti-takeover laws have been premised on
commerce clause and supremacy clause grounds.39
The supremacy clause4° of the United States Constitution prohibits
states from regulating an area in which Congress is competent to legis-
late if: (1) an express congressional intent to exclude state regulation
exists; 4' (2) congressional intent to exclude state regulation is implied
by a pervasive scheme of federal regulation;4 2 (3) a direct conflict exists
between state and federal regulatory schemes so that compliance with
both is physically impossible; 4 or (4) state regulation stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution em-
powers Congress to "regulate Commerce ... among the several
States." 45 The commerce clause limits state power to regulate interstate
commerce, even absent federal regulation. 6 In general, the commerce
clause prohibits the direct regulation of interstate commerce by a
state, 47 state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce"
or subjects interstate commercial activities to inconsistent regulation by
different states, 49 and state regulation of interstate commerce which
39. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1978), reversed sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp, 443 U.S. 17 (1979).
40. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land..., any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
42. See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 632 (1973) (pervasive
scheme of federal aircraft noise regulation suggests preemption of state law).
43. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (dis-
cussing hypothetical physical impossibility and citing relevant cases).
44. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
45. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
46. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 57 U.S. (12 How.) 624, 640 (1851).
47. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945); Shafer v. Farmers
Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925).
48. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980); City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
49. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583-84
(1986).
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imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is excessive in relation to
the local interests served by the regulation.50
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell5 was the first appellate
court decision to address the constitutionality of a state tender offer
law.12 In that case, the hostile bidder was a Delaware corporation with
its principal offices in Texas. The target was a Washington corporation
with its principal office and substantial assets in Idaho. The target
shareholders lived all across the United States. The target corporation
also had a subsidiary in Maryland and conducted business in New
York."
The bidder challenged the validity of the Idaho Takeover Statute,
which regulated target companies that had substantial assets in Idaho
or which had securites registered under the Idaho Code or Exchange
Act and were incorporated or headquartered in Idaho.54 To acquire
such a target, an offeror had to file a registration statement with the
Idaho Director of Finance and target management. The offer could
not begin until the Director of Finance declared the registration state-
ment effective. The Director of Finance or target management could
require a hearing, and the offer was delayed until the final determina-
tion of any administrative or injunctive proceeding brought by the Di-
rector of Finance. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated
the statute on both supremacy clause and commerce clause grounds. In
discussing preemption, the court noted that Congress did not explicitly
preempt state takeover regulation, and the court did not decide
whether Congress had implicitly done so. The court relied instead on
its finding that the statute conflicted with the Williams Act's policy of
neutrality. 56 The court found that the statute favored incumbent man-
50. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1649-52 (1987); MITE, 457 U.S. at 643. One Justice has questioned the
necessity of applying this balancing test to state takeover laws. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652-53 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
51. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443
U.S. 173 (1979).
52. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcunrrtas REGULATION 393 (1985).
53. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1260-62. In its commerce clause discussion, the court noted the
possibility of the bidder being subject to conflicting regulation from Idaho and New York, but
concluded that other evidence supported its findings. Id. at 1284-85.
54. Id. at 1263 n.12 (citing IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (1978)). The Kidwell bidder passed both
tests, with principal offices and substantial assets in Idaho. Id.
55. Id. at 1263 (citing IDAHO CODE § 30-1503 (1978)). There was no time limit within which
the Director of Finance had to make a final determination. Id.; see IDAHO CODE 30-1503(4), (5)
(1978) (Director of Finance had to announce a decision within thirty days of the registration's
filing unless more time was needed.).
56. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1274-81.
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agement by giving them advance notice of tender offers and the power
to postpone offers indefinitely and by not regulating target defenses as
strictly as hostile bids.1
7
The court also struck the Idaho statute under the balancing-test
branch of the commerce clause. The court considered the local inter-
ests of preserving local industry, maintaining civic leadership, and pro-
tecting investors, and concluded that these interests did not outweigh
the statute's interference with transactions all over the country. The
court noted that in this case the statute had halted thirty-one million
dollars worth of interstate commerce and that Idaho had little reason
to protect investors in other states.5 8 One judge dissented on personal
jurisdiction and venue grounds, but would have agreed with the major-
ity on the merits.5 9 On appeal the Supreme Court disposed of the case
on a venue issue and never addressed the constitutionality of the stat-
ute.60
In the wake of Kidwell, the SEC adopted new tender offer rules,
which were intended to preempt state regulation by creating a direct
conflict with most state statutes. Before the rules could be tested, how-
ever, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits reached opposite results regard-
ing the Virginia and Illinois statutes. The Supreme Court decided to
review the Illinois case; thus, in Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,61 the constitu-
tionality of a state tender offer law was squarely before the Court for
the first time. 62
57. Id. at 1278. The Idaho statute allowed incumbent management to exclude any offer from
state regulation by approving it. Id. (citing IDAHO CODE 30-1501(5)(3)).
58. Id. at 1282-86.
59. Id. at 1287-96 (Godbold, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
60. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). In a dissenting opinion,
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall disagreed with this disposition and would have reached the
merits of the case. These Justices and the Fifth Circuit would have based personal jurisdiction and
venue on section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). The Fifth Circuit's theory was that
section 28 of the Act, id. § 78bb, saving state securities laws not in conflict with federal law,
implicitly proscribed inconsistent state law, and enforcement of inconsistent state law was thus a
"violation" over which section 27 gave jurisdiction and venue. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1256, 1270-
74. While Justice White did not cite section 28, his reasoning was virtually identical: venue was
proper where the defendant had sought to enforce the inconsistent law. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 187-92
(White, J., dissenting). Justice White never discussed the merits of the case, but the tone of his
personal jurisdiction and venue discussion foreshadows his later positions: "[T]he very enactment
and existence of the Williams Act pre-empts and invalidates all conflicting state efforts to regulate
cash tender offers." Id. at 190. Of course, the word "conflicting" makes this statement tautologi-
cal.
61. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
62. T. HAZEN, supra note 52, at 395 (citing Sec. Act Rel. No. 6022 (SEC Feb. 5, 1979); Sec.
Act Rel. No. 6158 (SEC Nov. 29, 1979); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6159 (SEC Nov. 29, 1979); Telvest v.
Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980),
aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)). The Supreme Court noted that the
new rules were not at issue in MITE. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 636 n. 11 (1982).
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MITE involved a cash tender offer by MITE, a Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal office in Connecticut, for all the outstanding
shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. 63
MITE filed with the SEC all the information required by the Williams
Act, but did not comply with the Illinois Business Take-Over Act,
electing instead to seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in
federal court. 64
The Illinois Act required the registration of any tender offer for
shares of a "target company" with the Secretary of State of Illinois. A
"target company" was defined as any corporation of which sharehold-
ers located in Illinois owned ten percent of the equity securities subject
to the tender offer or for which any two of the following three condi-
tions were satisfied: the corporation was incorporated in Illinois; the
corporation's principal executive office was in Illinois; or at least ten
percent of the corporation's stated capital and paid-in surplus was rep-
resented within Illinois. 65
A tender offer registration became effective twenty days after filing
the registration with the Secretary of State and notifying the target of
the terms of the offer, unless the Secretary of State, believing it neces-
sary for the protection of investors, called a hearing to adjudicate the
substantive fairness of the offer.66 This hearing was mandatory if re-
quested by a majority of the target company's outside directors or by
Illinois shareholders owning ten percent of the class of securities sub-
ject to the tender offer. 67 After the hearing, the statute directed the
Secretary of State to deny registration if the tender offer "[failed] to
provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees of all material informa-
tion concerning the take-over offer, or ... [was] inequitable or would
work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the offerees. "68 During
the waiting period, the bidder could not communicate with target
shareholders, although incumbent management could contact these
shareholders freely.69
A majority of the Court invalidated the statute using the balancing
test under the commerce clause, stating that "even when a state statute
regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the burden imposed on that
commerce must not be excessive in relation to the local interests served
63. MITE, 457 U.S. at 627.
64. Id. at 628.
65. Id. at 626-27 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.52-10, .54.A (1979)).
66. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127 1/2, para. 137.57.E (1979)).
67. Id. (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127 1/2, para. 137.57.A (1979)).
68. Id. (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127 1/2, para. 137.57.E (1979)).
69. Id. at 635 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54.A (1979)).
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by the statute." ' 70 The Court stated that the most obvious burden im-
posed by the statute was its "nationwide reach which purports to give
Illinois the power to determine whether a tender offer may proceed
anywhere. "7 ' The Court noted that the effects of this burden were sub-
stantial: shareholders were deprived of an opportunity to tender their
shares at a premium; reallocation of economic resources to their high-
est value was impeded; and the incentive for management to perform
well was reduced. 72
Illinois argued that the statute advanced two legitimate local inter-
ests: (1) protection of investors and (2) regulation of the internal af-
fairs of Illinois corporations. The Court found these interests
insufficient to outweigh the burden imposed. 73 The Court agreed that
protecting local investors was a legitimate state objective, but reasoned
that "the State has no legitimate interest in protecting non-resident
shareholders. " 74 The Court also observed that the Illinois Act ex-
empted issuer tender offers for its own securities, and reasoned that
this undermined the state's assertion that the statutory purpose was
shareholder protection. 75 Moreover, because many of the statute's pro-
visions were similar to the requirements of the Williams Act, the Court
questioned whether the statute would "substantially enhance the share-
holders' ability to make informed decisions." 76
The Court also rejected Illinois' argument that the statute was justi-
fied by its interest in regulating the internal affairs of its corpora-
tions. 77 The Court stated that tender offers, which involve the transfer
of stock by shareholders to third parties, do not implicate the internal
affairs doctrine. 78 The Court found the internal affairs argument
"somewhat incredible" because the Illinois Act applied to corpora-
tions that were not incorporated in Illinois and had their principal
places of business outside of Illinois.79
Four Justices considered the Illinois Act a direct burden on interstate
commerce because it could apply to target corporations without a sin-
gle Illinois shareholder.80 Further, these Justices expressed concern that
70. Id. at 643 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
71. Id. at 640.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 644.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 645 (quoting the Seventh Circuit's decision, MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486,
500 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)).
77. Id.
78. Id. (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 642-43 (plurality opinion). The four Justices were White, Burger, Stevens and
O'Connor. Id. at 626.
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other states could impose similar regulations and "throroughly sti-
fle[ ]" interstate tender offers.'
Three Justices concluded that the Illinois Act violated the supremacy
clause.82 These Justices reasoned that the statute frustrated the objec-
tives of the Williams Act by upsetting the balance struck by Congress
between the interests of tender offerors and target companies. 3 They
pointed to three provisions of the Illinois statute that upset this bal-
ance: (1) the provision for a mandatory twenty-day waiting period af-
ter filing the registration during which only the target could
communicate with shareholders, which gave incumbent management
additional time to take defensive steps, (2) the hearing provisions,
which gave both the Secretary of State and incumbent management the
opportunity to delay the offer indefinitely, and (3) the provision allow-
ing the Secretary of State to determine the substantive fairness of a
tender offer, which conflicted with a fundamental purpose of the Wil-
liams Act-investor autonomy. 4
After MITE, states began developing "second generation" anti-
takeover statutes designed to pass constitutional muster. 5 The Su-
preme Court upheld one such statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp.8 6 The Indiana statute involved in CTS was of the "control share
acquisition" model. Voting rights of stock acquired in a transaction
that brought voting power to or above any of three thresholds were
conditioned on approval by a majority of pre-existing, disinterested
shareholders 87
The shareholders decided whether to grant voting rights at their next
regularly scheduled meeting or at a specially scheduled meeting. The
bidder could require management to hold a special meeting within fifty
81. Id. "It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute . . . has a sweeping extraterritorial
effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose such regulations, so may other states; and interstate
commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be thoroughly stifled." Id.
82. Id. at 630-40 (plurality opinion). Justices White, Burger, and Blackmun joined this part
of the opinion. Id. at 626.
83. Id. at 633. The Court noted that one objective of the Williams Act was to protect inves-
tors, but stated: "[lit is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor
was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder." Id. The Court noted that the
Williams Act had originally been drafted with a strong pro-management bias, but Congress had
"become convinced 'that takeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a useful
purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management."' Id. (quoting S. REP.
No. 550, supra note 11, at 3-4). The Court also quoted Senator Williams' statement in the Con-
gressional Record: "We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids." Id. (citing 113 CONG. REC.
24,664 (1967)).
84. Id. at 634-40.
85. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
86. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
87. Id. at 1641 (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-9(a) (Supp. 1986)).
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days by filing an "acquiring person statement"88 and agreeing to pay
the expenses of the meeting. 89 This statute applied only to target corpo-
rations incorporated in Indiana and meeting all three of the following
requirements: (1) having 100 or more shareholders; (2) having its prin-
cipal place of business, its principal office, or substantial assets within
Indiana; and (3) having either more than ten percent of its sharehold-
ers resident in Indiana, more than ten percent of its shares owned by
Indiana residents, or 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana. 9° During
a transitional phase, such corporations could elect to be governed by
the statute, and subsequently, all such corporations would be governed
unless they elected out. 91
Dynamics Corporation owned 9.6% of the stock of CTS, an Indiana
corporation. Six days after the statute went into effect, Dynamics
made a tender offer for another million shares and sued CTS in federal
court alleging various violations of federal securities law. CTS then
elected to be governed by the statute, and Dynamics amended its com-
plaint to allege that the Indiana statute was preempted by the Williams
Act and void under the commerce clause. 92
The Court first addressed the MITE plurality's finding that the Illi-
nois statute had violated the supremacy clause by upsetting the balance
between offerors and targets93 and recounted the three offending provi-
sions that the plurality had identified. The Court emphasized that the
plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of
the Court and thus was not binding. Nevertheless, the Court stated:
"We need not question that reasoning, however, because we believe
the Indiana Act passes muster even under the broad interpretation of
the Williams Act articulated by Justice WHITE in MITE." 94 The
Court reasoned that both the Williams Act and the Indiana statute op-
erated on the assumption that tender offers are coercive and leave in-
dependent shareholders at a disadvantage, particularly "two-step"
tender offers in which the tender offer is followed by a merger or other
transaction in which untendered shares are acquired at a lower price. 95
88. Id. at 1642 (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-6 (Supp. 1986)).
89. Id. (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7 (Supp. 1986)).
90. Id. at 1641 (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a) (Supp. 1986)).
91. Id. (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-17-3 (Supp. 1986)).
92. Id. at 1642.
93. The Court offered a somewhat more limited articulation of the Williams Act's policy of
neutrality: "[T]he overriding concern of the MITE plurality was that the Illinois statute consid-
ered in that case operated to favor management against offerors, to the detriment of sharehold-
ers." Id. at 1645 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1646. Business combination statutes, such as the Florida Affiliated Transactions
Statute, are aimed more directly at two-step offers. Some commentators have argued that the
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The Court reasoned that the Indiana Act protected investors from such
coercive offers because "the shareholders as a group .. .could reject
the offer, although individuai shareholders might be inclined to accept
it.,,96
The Court also rejected an argument that the Indiana statute con-
flicted with the Williams Act requirement that a tender offer be kept
open for twenty days because, in practice, the statute imposed a fifty-
day delay: 97
The [Indiana] Act does not impose an absolute 50-day delay on
tender offers, nor does it preclude an offeror from purchasing shares
as soon as federal law permits. If the offeror fears an adverse
shareholder vote under the Act, it can make a conditional tender
offer, offering to accept shares on the condition that the shares
receive voting rights within a certain period of time.98
The Court further stated that even if the statute imposed some addi-
tional delay, "nothing in MITE suggested that any delay imposed by
state regulation, however short, would create a conflict with the Wil-
liams Act. The plurality argued only that the offeror should 'be free to
go forward without unreasonable delay.'"9
The Court began its commerce clause analysis by addressing two ar-
guments that the statute burdened interstate commerce directly. Dy-
namics argued that the statute discriminated against interstate
commerce, reasoning that it would apply most often to out-of-state
bidders because "as a practical matter, most hostile tender offers are
launched by offerors outside Indiana."l00 The Court rejected the argu-
ment that this amounted to discrimination against out-of-state offer-
ors: "Because nothing in the Indiana Act imposes a greater burden on
coerciveness of a two-step offer counteracts the "holdout" problem inherent in a one-step offer
and is thus in the best long-run interests of shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Con-
trol Transactions, 91 Y A L.J. 698, 710 (1982); Banoff, The Securities Commission's Takeover
Proposals: A "Law and Economics" Perspective, 2 CANTEuRY L. REV. 298, 310 (1985) (citing
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra). Of course, if the second step price is less than the fair market value
of the shares at that time, dissatisfied shareholders will have a state-law action for self-dealing
and, in many states, a statutory "appraisal right" to receive the fair market value of their shares.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.247 (1989).
96. Id. at 1646. Justice White, dissenting, pointed to this same fact to argue that the Indiana
statute conflicted with the Williams Act's concern for individual investor autonomy. Id. at 1654
(White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1646-48. Fifty days was the latest incumbent management could schedule a meeting
after the bidder filed its "acquiring person statement." Id. at 1642 (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-
10(a) (Supp. 1986)).
98. Id. at 1647.
99. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982)).
100. Id. at 1649.
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out-of-state offerors than it does on similarly situated Indiana offer-
ors, we reject the contention that the Act discriminates against inter-
state commerce." 0' Because the Indiana statute applied only to targets
incorporated in Indiana, the Court also rejected the argument that the
statute might subject acquirers to inconsistent state regulation: "So
long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has
created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
State."12
The Court also held that the statute passed the balancing test under
the commerce clause. The Court found that the statute served two le-
gitimate state interests: (1) regulating voting rights and other internal
affairs of the corporations created by the state, 103 and (2) protecting
shareholders against coercive tender offers by "allowing shareholders
collectively to determine whether the takeover is advantageous to their
interests.''°4 The Court distinguished the statement in MITE that a
state has "no legitimate interest in protecting the nonresident
shareholders"'' 05 on the basis that the Indiana statute applied only to
targets incorporated in Indiana and having a substantial number of
shareholders in Indiana. 6 Although the Court was unconvinced that
the statute would substantially limit the number of successful tender
offers, it emphasized that its commerce clause analysis would not
change even if this were true. ,0
Since CTS, federal courts have reviewed a number of state takeover
laws. Although some questions remain regarding the constitutionality
of state takeover laws that delay tender offers but still permit them to
be completed within the sixty day period required by the Williams
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1650-51.
104. Id. at 1651. The Court reasoned that the statute protected shareholders by giving them
"an opportunity to decide collectively whether the resulting change in voting control of the corpo-
ration, as they perceive it, would be desirable. A change of management may have important
effects on the shareholders' interests; it is well within the State's role as overseer of corporate
governance to offer this opportunity." Id.
105. Id. (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982)).
106. Id. at 1651-52.
107. Id. at 1652. Justice Scalia joined in all parts of the majority opinion except the balanc-
ing-test analysis. In his view, this branch of commerce clause analysis should be abandoned: "As
long as a State's corporation law governs only its own corporations and does not discriminate
against out-of-state interests, it should survive this Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause,
whether it promotes shareholder welfare or industrial stagnation." Id. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Justice Scalia concluded: "I do not share the Court's apparent high estimation of the benef-
icence of the state statue at issue here. But a law can be both economic folly and constitutional.
The Indiana Control Shares Acquisition Chapter is at least the latter." Id.
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Act, 1°8 state takeover laws that regulate the exercise of control after the
acquisition of shares are generally constitutional if they apply only to
target businesses incorporated in the state implementing the regula-
tion. 109
In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., I1O the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Wisconsin Business Combination Statute (Wiscon-
sin Act)."' The Wisconsin Act prohibits a firm incorporated in
Wisconsin and having its headquarters, substantial operations, or ten
percent of its shares or stockholders in Wisconsin from "engag[ing] in
a business combination with an interested stockholder . . . for three
years after the interested stockholder's stock acquisition date unless the
board of directors of the corporation has approved, before the inter-
ested stockholder's stock acquisition date, that business combination
or the purchase of stock.""' 2 The Wisconsin Act defines "business
combination" much as Florida's statute defines "affiliated transac-
tion":"3 A Wisconsin "business combination" is a merger with an in-
terested stockholder or affiliate, a sale of more than five percent of the
assets to an interested stockholder or affiliate, a liquidation of the ac-
quired corporation, a transaction by which the acquired corporation
guarantees a debt of an interested stockholder or affiliate, or a transac-
tion by which the acquired corporation passes tax benefits to a bidder
or affiliate. " 4
Amanda Acquisition Corporation sued for a declaratory judgment
that the Wisconsin Act was "preempted by the Williams Act and in-
108. Compare Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Ohio
1988) (holding Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act, Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson
1964 & Supp. 1989), constitutional) with Batus, Inc. v. McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637 (D. Nev. 1988)
(holding Nevada Takeover Act, NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(1) (1986), unconstitutional under both
the commerce clause and the supremacy clause).
109. Compare Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 506-09
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding Wisconsin's Business Combinations Act, Wis. STAT. § 180.726 (1987),
constitutional) and BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 473 (D. Del. 1988) (holding
Delaware Business Combinations Statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988), probably constitu-
tional) with Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99, 100 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding Tenessee
Business Combination Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-201-209 (1988), along with three other
statutes, unconstitutional "to the extent that they apply to target corporations organized under
the laws of states other than Tennessee") and Grand Metro., P.L.C. v. Butterworth, Civ. A. No.
88-40317WS, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 1988) (holding Florida Affiliated Transactions
Statute, FLA. STAT. § 607.108 (1987), and two other statutes, unconstitutional because they "pur-
port to regulate the internal affairs of out-of-state corporations even though Florida has no legally
recognizable interest in doing so").
110. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
111. Id.
112. WIs. STAT. § 180.726(2) (1987).
113. See FLA. STAT. § 607.108(l)(b) (1989).
114. WIS. STAT. § 180.726(1)(e) (1987).
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consistent with the Commerce Clause." ' The court's supremacy
clause analysis of Amanda's preemption claim turned on the court's
articulation of the neutrality objective of the Williams Act:
To say that Congress wanted to be neutral between bidder and
target-a conclusion reached in many of the Court's opinions, e.g.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 926, 51 L.
Ed. 2d 124 (1977)-is not to say that it also forbade the states to
favor one of these sides .... Nothing in the Williams Act says that
the federal compromise among bidders, targets' managers, and
investors is the only permissible one. ",6
Observing that the Williams Act regulates the process of tender of-
fers-such as timing, disclosure, and proration-and that the Wiscon-
sin Act does not address the tender offer process, the court rejected
Amanda's assertion of supremacy clause preemption. The court found
that the Wisconsin Act neither alters any procedures governed by fed-
eral law nor conditions its application on how a party acquires its
stock, whether by tender offer, open-market purchases, or privately
negotiated transactions. The court noted that the Wisconsin Act is sim-
ilar to many other state laws governing the internal affairs of a domes-
tic corporation and that the Act is "no different in effect from one
saying that for the three years after a person acquires 10% of a firm's
stock, a unanimous vote is required to merge.""17
The court also rejected Amanda's argument that the Williams Act
entitled investors to receive the benefit of tender offers and that the
Wisconsin statute was therefore preempted because it made tender of-
fers less attractive to potential bidders:
Only if the Williams Act gives investors a right to be the beneficiary
of offers could Wisconsin's law run afoul of the federal rule. No such
entitlement can be mined out of the Williams Act .... Investors
have no right to receive tender offers. More to the point-since
Amanda sues as bidder rather than as investor seeking to sell-the
Williams Act does not create a right to profit from the business of
making tender offers. It is not attractive to put bids on the table for
Wisconsin corporations, but because Wisconsin leaves the process
alone once a bidder appears, its law may co-exist with the Williams
Act."'8
115. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 499.
116. Id. at 503 (citing Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Wil-
liams Act, the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading, 1987 SuP. CT. Rlv. 47, 71-74 (1987)).
117. Id. at 504.
118. Id. at 504-05 (citations omitted).
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Similarly, the court rejected the "meaningful opportunity" test de-
veloped for analyzing business combination statutes by the United
States District Court for Delaware. 1" 9 In BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co.,2 °
the plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the Delaware Business
Combination Statute.' 2' The plaintiff argued that the Williams Act pre-
empted the Delaware statute because the Delaware law favors the tar-
get corporation's management over the offeror and, therefore,
frustrates the shareholder protection purpose of the Williams Act.' 22
The Delaware district court conceded that "allowing [states] to deprive
the tender offeror of. . .a business combination [ ] would permit a de
facto frustration of the goals of the Williams Act," but stated that the
Delaware statute would not be preempted "so long as hostile offers
which are beneficial to target shareholders have a meaningful opportu-
nity for success.' ' 23 The circuit court in Amanda rejected this test. 2 4
The circuit court also rejected plaintiff's commerce clause challenges
because it determined that the Wisconsin Act neither discriminates
against interstate commerce nor subjects corporations to the risk of
inconsistent state regulation any more than did the Indiana statute up-
held in CTS. 15 The court declined to apply the balancing test used in
MITE on the grounds that "CTS dispatched this concern by declaring
it inapplicable to laws that apply only to the internal affairs of firms
incorporated in the regulating state.' ' 26 The court concluded that
119. Id. at 508 ("The Commerce Clause does not demand that states leave bidders a 'mean-
ingful opportunity for success."'). See BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D. Del.
1988); see also RP Acquisition Corp. v. Stanley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp 476 (D. Del.
1988); City Capital'Assocs. v. Interco, 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del. 1988); accord West Point-
Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc., No. 3:88-cv-57-GET (N.D. Ga. February 2, 1989).
120. 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
122. BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 460.
123. Id. at 468-69. Based on CTS, the court concluded that four questions determine whether
a state takeover law is preempted by the Williams Act and sustained the validity of the Delaware
Act under the supremacy clause:
First, does the statute protect independent shareholders from coercion? Second, does
the statute give either management or the offeror an advantage in communicating with
stockholders? This question may be reformulated to fit the circumstances of the present
case by phrasing it as whether the statute gives either management or the offeror an
advantage in consummating or defeating an offer. Third, does the statute impose an
indefinite or unreasonable delay on offers? And fourth, does the statute allow the state
government to interpose its views of fairness between willing buyers and sellers? The
answers to these questions indicate that, although the issue is not an easy one, on this
preliminary injunction record, the Delaware statute does not conflict with the purposes
of the Williams Act to an impermissible degree.
Id. at 469 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1646 (1987)).
124. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 1989).
125. Id. at 506-07 (citing CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649-50).
126. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 507 (citing CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649-52. This is consistent with
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"Wisconsin's law may well be folly; we are confident that it is consti-
tutional.'" 12
7
Although Amanda and CTS indicate that business combination laws
that apply only to domestic corporations are constitutional, courts
have invalidated state takeover laws that regulate companies incorpo-
rated in states other than the regulating state.'28 In Tyson Foods, Inc.
v. McReynolds,129 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of
Tennessee takeover laws, ruling them unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause to the extent that they regulated foreign corporations. 30
The case involved a nationwide cash tender offer for the common
stock of Holly Farms Corporation, a Delaware corporation, by Tyson
Foods, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Holly Acquisition Corpo-
ration, both of which are Delaware corporations. The Tennessee Au-
thorized Corporation Act allowed a qualified foreign corporation to
elect to be subject to Tennessee takeover regulation; Holly Farms made
that election. The court held that the Tennessee Authorized Corpora-
tion Act directly regulated interstate commerce and also imposed an
excessive burden on interstate commerce relative to the local interests it
served. 3 '
In Grand Metropolitan P.L.C. v. Butterworth,'32 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida enjoined the Pills-
bury Company (Pillsbury) and the Florida Attorney General from en-
forcing both the Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute and the
MITE: "Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be
weighed in the balance to sustain the law." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
127. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 509; see also BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D.
Del. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the Delaware Business Combinations Statute, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988), against supremacy and commerce clause challenges).
128. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99, 100 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding the
Tennessee Investor Protection Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-101 to -113 (1988), the Tennessee
Business Combination Act, id. §§ 48-35-201 to -209, the Tennessee Control Share Acquisition
Act, id. §§ 48-35-301 to -312, and the Tennessee Authorized Corporation Protection Act, id. §§
48-35-401 to -406, unconstitutional under the commerce clause "to the extent that they apply to
target corporations organized under the laws of states other than Tennessee"). As Tyson illus-
trates, both control share acquisition acts and business combination acts that apply to foreign
corporations are considered unconstitutional under the commerce clause. See also TLX Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (the Oklahoma Control
Shares Act, 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 146, §§ 15-23, "violates the Commerce Clause because the
Act creates an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation of tender offers and voting rights in
stock by different states. Further, it imposes an indirect burden on interstate commerce that is
excessive in relation to Oklahoma's interest in protection of resident shareholders and businesses
.... ").
129. 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 100.
131. Id.
132. Civ. A. No. 88-40317WS (N.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 1988).
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Control-Share Acquisitions Statute. Plaintiffs, Grand Metropolitan,
P.L.C. and Wendell Investments, Limited (together "Grand Met"),
each organized under the laws of England, offered to purchase all the
outstanding stock of Pillsbury, a Delaware corporation. Grand Met
sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of both laws
and a declaratory judgment that those laws, as applied to foreign cor-
porations, were unconstitutional under the commerce clause, the su-
premacy clause, the due process clause, and the full faith and credit
clause.'33 The court held Florida's laws unconstitutional on commerce
clause grounds because they improperly "regulate[d] the internal af-
fairs of out-of-state corporations" and subjected foreign corporations
to the risk of inconsistent regulation by different states. 34 Citing
MITE, the court found that Florida lacked a legally recognizable inter-
est in regulating the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The court
did not address the plaintiffs' other asserted grounds for unconstitu-
tionality. "
Notably, both Tyson and Grand Metropolitan struck down state
takeover laws notwithstanding that each law contained a savings clause
that purported to avoid the risk of inconsistent regulation by different
states. Both courts concluded that savings clauses are not effective in
overcoming the risk of inconsistent regulation. In addition, the courts
noted that a savings clause would not be effective in resolving different
states' attempts to regulate foreign corporations.'3 6
II. SUMMARY OF STATUTE
Second-generation anti-takeover statutes are generally of two types:
"control-share acquisition" statutes, such as the one involved in CTS,
and "business combination" statutes, which regulate what acquirers
133. Id. at 2.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id. at 15 (citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, Civ. A. No. 3-88-0881, slip op. at 10
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 23, 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989)). The Tennessee Act provides:
If any jurisdiction under the laws of which an authorized corporation is organized
adopts any laws containing provisions that are expressly inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this part as applicable to such authorized corporation, the provisions of this
part shall be inapplicable to such authorized corporation to the extent necessary to
resolve such inconsistency.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-405 (1988).
Likewise, the Florida Act provides:
If the laws of any jurisdiction under which a foreign corporation is organized contain
provisions that are expressly inconsistent with the provisions of this section as applica-
ble to such foreign corporation, the provisions of this section shall be inapplicable to
such foreign corporation to the extent necessary to resolve such inconsistency.
FLA. STAT. § 607.110(3) (1989).
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can do in the second step of a two-step acquisition.' Some commenta-
tors have argued that control-share acquisition statutes favor hostile
bidders by allowing them to bypass management and demand a share-
holder vote on the proposed acquisition. 3 In contrast, business combi-
nation statutes are aimed at "front-end loaded" acquisitions, in which
a bidder acquires control through an initial tender offer and subse-
quently attempts to acquire all remaining shares at a lower price. The
Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute follows the same general
scheme as other business combination statutes: it defines certain regu-
lated transactions and then requires that these transactions either gain
special approval from disinterested management or shareholders or
that a statutory "fair price" be paid to shareholders.
The Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute' regulates certain trans-
actions between a corporation and an "interested shareholder" -one
who beneficially owns more than ten percent of the corporation's out-
standing voting shares.14° "Affiliated transaction" means:
137. R. GILsON & R. K , Ti LAW AND FINANcE OF CORPORATE AcQuismoNs 307-15
(Supp. 1988) (comparing the Indiana statute involved in CTS with the Delaware business combi-
nation statute, loosely modeled on an earlier New York statute).
138. See, e.g., id. at 310. Gilson and Kraakman relate that Delaware drafted a control share
acquisition statute before it drafted its now-famous business combination statute, and that this
draft "was withdrawn almost as rapidly as it had been drafted, largely because the bar correctly
suspected that a control share acquisition statute was more likely to aid acquirers than target
managers." Id. at 313 (citing Black, Why Delaware is Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, Wall St. J.,
July 10, 1987, at 20, col. 3). It might be more accurate to argue that such statutes benefit bidders
by allowing them to air their views at a shareholder meeting, since shareholders always get to vote
on any tender offer by deciding whether or not to tender.
139. FLA. STAT. § 607.108 (1989).
140. Id. § 607.108(l)(k). The corporation and its subsidiaries, along with savings, employee
stock ownership, and other employee benefit plans and the fiduciaries of such plans, are excepted.
Id. The statute does not address how to count classified stock with different voting rights.
The statute delineates beneficial ownership as follows:
A person is deemed to be a "beneficial owner" of voting shares as to which such per-
son and such person's affiliates and associates, individually or in the aggregate, have or
share directly, or indirectly through any contract, arrangement, understanding, rela-
tionship, or otherwise:
I. Voting power, which includes the power to vote or to direct the voting of the voting
shares;
2. Investment power, which includes the power to dispose of or to direct the disposi-
tion of the voting shares; or
3. The right to acquire the voting power or investment power, whether such right is
exercisable immediately or only after the passage of time, pursuant to any contract,
arrangement, or understanding, upon the exercise of conversion rights, exchange rights,
warrants, or options, or otherwise; however, in no case shall a director of the corpora-
tion be deemed to be the beneficial owner of voting shares beneficially owned by an-
other director of the corporation solely by reason of actions undertaken by such
persons in their capacity as directors of the corporation.
Id. § 607.108(l)(e). Shares described in (e)(3) are counted as outstanding voting shares to deter-
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1. Any merger or consolidation of the corporation or any subsidiary
of the corporation with:
a. The interested shareholder; or
b. Any other corporation (whether or not itself an interested
shareholder) which is, or after such merger or consoliation would be,
an affiliate or associate 41 of the interested shareholder;
2. Any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer, or other
disposition (in one transaction or a series of transactions)' 4 to or with
the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the
interested shareholder of assets of the corporation or any subsidiary
of the corporation:
a. Having an aggregate market value equal to 5 percent or more of
the aggregate market value of all the assets, determined on a
consolidated basis, of the corporation;
mine whether a person is an interested shareholder, but shares issuable to other persons under
similar rights are not. Id. § 607.108(l)(k). This definition of "beneficial ownership" is similar to
the one under the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (1989); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8(a)
(1989); Exchange Act Release No. 34-18114 (Sept. 23, 1981) (promulgating 17 C.F.R. §
241.18114); Exchange Act Release No. 34-7793 (Jan. 19, 1966) (promulgating 17 C.F.R. §
241.7793); SEC Release No. 34-1965 (Dec. 21, 1938) (promulgating 17 C.F.R. § 241.1965). How-
ever, federal law counts such rights owned by other shareholders in determining the total number
of shares outstanding. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(d) (1989).
The statute provides:
"Person" means an individual, including the estate of an incompetent or deceased indi-
vidual; a corporation, whether or not organized for profit or under the law of this state
or any other jurisdiction; a profit or not-for-profit unincorporated association; a busi-
ness trust, an estate, a partnership, a trust, or two or more persons having a joint or
common economic interest; and a state, the United States or a foreign government,
including any political or quasi-political subdivision thereof.
Id. § 607.108(l)(1). In particular, the "common economic interest" test is disturbingly vague.
Would shareholders who together own more than ten percent of the stock of the corporation be a
"person" and thus an interested shareholder? Courts applying the Williams Act generally find
that a "group" exists when several shareholders agree to pool their interests in corporate securities
and to act in concert to carry out a plan to obtain control of a corporation. GAF Corp. v. Mil-
stein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Trans World Corp. v. Odys-
sey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bath Indus. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.
Wis. 1969).
141. "'Affiliate' means a person who directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediar-
ies, controls or is controlled by, or is under common control with, a specified person." FLA. STAT.
§ 607.108(l)(a) (1989). "Associate" means
any entity, other than the corporation or any of its subsidiaries, of which such person is
an officer, director or partner or is, directly or indirectly, the beneficial owner of 10
percent or more of any class of voting shares; any trust or other estate in which such
person has a substantial beneficial interest or as to which such person serves as trustee
or in a similar fiduciary capacity; and any relative or spouse of such person, or any
relative of such spouse, who has the same home as such person or who is an officer or
director of the corporation or any of its affiliates.
Id. § 607.108(1)(d).
142. This seems to prohibit even sales in the ordinary course of business that cumulatively
exceed the statutory threshold.
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b. Having an aggregate market value equal to 5 percent or more of
the aggregate market value of all the outstanding shares of the
corporation; or
c. Representing 5 percent or more of the earning power or net
income, determined on a consolidated basis, of the corporation;
43
3. The issuance or transfer by the corporation or any subsidiary of
the corporation (in one transaction or a series of transactions) of any
shares of the corporation or any subsidiary of the corporation which
have an aggregate market value equal to 5 percent or more of the
aggregate market value of all the outstanding shares of the
corporation to the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate
of the interested shareholder except pursuant to the exercise of
warrants or rights to purchase stock offered, or a dividend or
distribution paid or made, pro rata to all shareholders of the
corporation;'"
4. The adoption of any plan or proposal for the liquidation or
dissolution of the corporation proposed by, or pursuant to any
agreement, arrangement, or understanding (whether or not in writing)
with, the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the
interested shareholder;
5. Any reclassification of securities (including, without limitation,
any stock split, stock dividend, or other distribution of shares in
respect of shares, or any reverse stock split) or recapitalization of the
corporation, or any merger or consolidation of the corporation with
143. "Fair market value" means, in the case of shares, the highest per-share price quoted on
the first of the following that is applicable: (1) the New York Stock Exchange, (2) the principal
exchange registered under the Exchange Act on which the shares are traded, or (3) NASDAQ. If
none are applicable, a majority of the disinterested directors determines the fair market value of
share. In the case of property other than cash or shares, fair market value is determined by a
majority of disinterested directors. Fla. Stat. § 607.108(1)(j) (1989).
144. A majority of disinterested directors determines whether this test is met. Id. §
607.108(3)(d). They also determine whether a person is an interested shareholder, the number of
voting shares beneficially owned by any person, and whether a person is an affiliate or associate
of another. Id. § 607.108(3). The statute does not explain how directors are to make these deter-
minations or how an affected person may challenge them.
Remember that shares that can be acquired pursuant to conversion or other rights are consid-
ered shares beneficially owned. Id. § 607.108(l)(e)(3). Thus, the issue of certain convertible securi-
ties, warrants, or other rights could be a prohibited affiliated transaction. Should value, for
purposes of this test, be the value of the right or the value of the share that can be acquired? The
latter seems harsh if the right is worthless because exercise price equals fair market value.
The exception in the last clause covers the situation in which rights to buy shares are offered
pro rata to all shareholders, but some rights expire without being exercised, and exercising share-
holders experience an increase in percentage of control. Are preemptive rights "rights" for pur-
poses of the exception? See id. § 607.077 (shareholders of Florida corporations have no
preemptive rights unless provided in the articles of incorporation; corporations existing before
January 1, 1976 have same preemptive rights as immediately before effective date of law unless
articles are amended).
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any subsidiary of the corporation, or any other transaction (whether
or not with or into or otherwise involving the interested shareholder),
with the interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of the
interested shareholder, which has the effect, directly or indirectly (in
one transaction or a series of transactions during any 12-month
period), of increasing by more than 5 percent the percentage of the
outstanding voting shares of the corporation or any subsidiary of the
corporation beneficially owned by the interested shareholder; 14 or
6. Any receipt by the interested shareholder or any affiliate or
associate of the interested shareholder of the benefit, directly or
indirectly (except proportionately as a shareholder of the
corporation), of any loans, advances, guaranties, pledges, or other
financial assistance or any tax credits or other tax advantages
provided by or through the corporation. 146
Affiliated transactions must be approved by a supermajority share-
holder vote 47 or a majority of the "disinterested directors," ' or come
within other exemptions in subsection (4).
Subsection (4) waives the voting requirements if certain conditions
are met. Two important waivers extend to dominant shareholders and
to a "fair price" alternative to section (2)'s voting requirement. First,
the voting requirements do not apply if "the interested shareholder has
been the beneficial owner of at least 80 percent of the corporation's
outstanding voting shares for at least 5 years preceding the announce-
ment date" 49 or if "[t]he interested shareholder is the beneficial owner
145. Would a bankruptcy reorganization proposed by the interested shareholder that met this
test be prohibited?
146. FLA. STAT. § 607.108(l)(b) (1989). Interestingly, no exception exists for transactions that
require approval of a court or other authority, such as securities issues requiring registration with
the Florida Division of Securities, bank mergers and acquisitions requiring the approval of state
or federal banking authorities, and transactions by insurance companies requiring the approval of
an insurance commissioner. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
147. Section 2 provides:
Except as provided in subsection (4), in addition to any affirmative vote required by
any other section of this chapter or by the articles of incorporation, an affiliated trans-
action shall be approved by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the
voting shares other than the shares beneficially owned by the interested shareholder.
FLA. STAT. § 607.108(2) (1989).
148. Id. § 607.108(4). A "disinterested director" is one who was a member of the board be-
fore January 1, 1987, or the determination date, see infra note 151, whichever is later, or who was
recommended for election by a majority of the disinterested directors, or who was elected to fill a
vacancy on the board by a majority of the disinterested directors. Id. § 607.108(1)(h). A corpora-
tion can provide a different definition in the articles of incorporation initially filed with the De-
partment of State. Id.
149. Id. § 607.108(4)(c). The announcement date is
the date of the first general public announcement of the proposed affiliated transaction
or of the intention to propose an affiliated transaction or the date on which the pro-
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of at least ninety percent of the outstanding voting shares of the corpo-
ration, exclusive of shares acquired directly from the corporation in a
transaction not approved by a majority of the disinterested direc-
tors."150
Second, the voting requirements are waived if a very complicated
"fair price" condition is satisfied:
In the affiliated transaction, consideration shall be paid to the holders
of each class or series of voting shares and all of the following
conditions shall be met:
1. The aggregate amount of the cash and the fair market value as of
the valuation date of consideration other than cash to be received per
share by holders of each class or series of voting shares in such
affiliated transaction are at least equal to the highest of the following:
a. If applicable, the highest per share price, including any
brokerage commisions, transfer taxes, and soliciting dealers' fees,
paid by the interested shareholder for any shares of such class or
series acquired by it within the 2-year period immediately preceding
the announcement date or in the transaction in which it became an
interested shareholder, whichever is higher;
b. The fair market value per share of such class or series on the
announcement date or on the determination date,' whichever is
higher;
c. If applicable, the price per share equal to the fair market value
per share of such class or series determined pursuant to sub-
subparagraph b., multiplied by the ratio of the highest per share
price, including any brokerage commissions, transfer taxes, and
soliciting dealers' fees, paid by the interested shareholder for any
shares of such class or series acquired by it within the 2-year period
immediately preceding the announcement date, to the fair market
value per share of such class or series on the first day in such 2-year
period on which the interested shareholder acquired any shares of
such class or series; and
d. If applicable, the highest preferential amount, if any, per share
to which the holders of such class or series are entitled in the event of
any voluntary or involuntary dissolution of the corporation. 52
posed affiliated transaction or the intention to propose an affiliated transaction is first
communicated generally to the shareholders of the corporation, whichever is earlier.
Id. § 607.108(l)(c).
150. Id. § 607.108(4)(d).
151. The determination date is "the date on which an interested shareholder became an inter-
ested shareholder." Id. § 607.108(l)(g).
152. Id. § 607.108(4)(f) (emphasis added).
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The statute also requires certain types of consideration'1 and prohibits
use of the fair-price alternative if there have been certain dividend re-
ductions.'- 4 Further, the fair-price alternative is unavailable if the inter-
ested shareholder received any loans, loan-like arrangements, or tax
advantages from the corporation in the three years before the affiliated
transaction was proposed, unless these were approved by a majority of
the disinterested directors. 155 Also, unless the board of directors ap-
proves otherwise, the interested shareholder must mail a proxy or in-
formation statement meeting federal proxy requirements to holders of
voting shares at least twenty-five days before consummation of the af-
filiated transaction, whether or not required by federal law. 56
The voting requirements of subsection (2) are also waived for small
corporations and investment companies. 5 7
Obviously, the word "corporation" includes any company incorpo-
rated in Florida, since the entire anti-takeover scheme is contained in
Florida's general corporate law.18 But in light of the constitutional ju-
risprudence surrounding state anti-takeover laws, the application of
the affiliated transactions statute (and control-share acquisition statute
as well) to foreign corporations in section 607.110 is extremely impor-
tant:
The provisions of [the affiliated transactions statute] shall also apply
to a foreign corporation that has:
(a) Been granted authority pursuant to this chapter to conduct
business in this state;
(b) One hundred or more shareholders;
(c) Its principal place of business, its principal office, or substantial
assets within this state;
(d) More than 500 residents of this state as employees; and
(e) Gross annual payroll of more than $5 million to residents of this
state; and
(f) Either:
1. More than 10 percent of its shareholders resident in this state;
2. More than 10 percent of its shares owned by residents of this
state; or
3. More than 1,000 shareholders resident in this state. 59
153. Id. § 607.108(4)(f)(2).
154. Id. § 607.108(4)(f)(3).
155. Id. § 607.108(4)(f)(4).
156. Id. § 607.108(4)(f)(5).
157. Id. § 607.108(4)(b), (e).
158. Id. ch. 607.
159. Id. § 607.110. In a very circuitous way, the control share acquisition statute applies to
foreign corporations if exactly the same test is met. See id. §§ 607.110(2), .109(4).
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Section 607.110 also contains a curious savings clause:
If the laws of any jurisdiction under the laws of which a foreign
corporation is organized contain provisions that are expressly
inconsistent with the provisions of this section as applicable to such
foreign corporation, the provisions of this section shall be
inapplicable to such foreign corporation to the extent necessary to
resolve such inconsistency.160
The presence of the words "[e]xcept as provided in [the savings
clause]" in the subsection dealing with the control-share acquisitions
statute, but not in the one dealing with the affiliated transactions stat-
ute, adds further confusion.' 61 The savings clause seems directed at the
implication in CTS that statutes not limited to domestic corporations
might be unconstitutional for subjecting bidders to the risk of inconsis-
tent state regulation. 162
Subsection (5) of section 607.108 governs election out of and back
into the statute's coverage and provides that the statute does not apply
to affiliated transactions with certain interested shareholders that be-
came such inadvertently. 63
160. Id. § 607.108(3).
161. Id. § 607.108.
162. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also supra note 136 and accompanying
text. This section is rife with ambiguity. Unanswered questions include: whether a corporation is
within the scope of the statute solely by virtue of a partnership, joint venture, or subsidiary that
satisfies the test of section 607.110; what constitutes "substantial assets"; how to determine the
situs of transient assets, such as vessels, airplanes, and rolling stock, or intangible assets, such as
stock, patents, goodwill, and accounts receivable; whether market value or book value is relevant
in determining whether assets are "substantial"; and whether the jurisdictional test is to be ap-
plied on the determination date, the announcement date, or the date the transaction is completed.
Presumably, "substantial assets" is a less stringent test than "all or substantially all the assets,"
the test for determining whether a sale of assets must be approved by shareholders. FLA. STAT. §
607.241 (1989); see Schwadel v. Uchitel, 455 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
To determine the residency of shareholders, a corporation may rely on its records and disregard
shares held in "street name" by banks, brokers, or nominees. FLA. STAT. § 607.110(l) (1989).
This seems inconsistent with the statute's purported purpose of protecting shareholders, particu-
larly considering how common "street name" ownership is. The provision is apparently directed
at the practical difficulty in determining the names and addresses of beneficial owners. However,
that difficulty has been overcome in other important areas. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1988); 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-13, .14b-I (1989).
A foreign corporation should have the burden of proving to an acquirer that it is protected by
the Act, because it has access to the information necessary to make that determination. The stat-
ute should be amended to require a corporation to provide to any ten-percent shareholder, upon
request, the information necessary to determine if the Act applies. This would be consistent with
the Act's vesting of authority in a majority of the disinterested directors to determine whether a
person is an interested director, whether a person is an affiliate or associate of a shareholder, and
the number of voting shares beneficially owned by a person.
163. FLA. STAT. § 607.108(5) (1989).
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The stated purpose of the statute is to protect resident shareholders.
It is intended to inhibit coercive "two-step, front-end loaded" takeov-
ers of a Florida corporation or a foreign corporation with substantial
ties to Florida. 164 It does not prohibit tender offers, regulate the acqui-
sition of voting control of a corporation, or even preclude a corporate
raider from taking complete control of a corporation's board of direc-
tors. Rather, it regulates corporate transactions that may directly or
indirectly benefit a purchaser after obtaining a controlling interest in a
target corporation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute raises several constitu-
tional issues. The following discussion addresses the constitutionality
of the statute under the supremacy clause, the commerce clause, the
full faith and credit clause, and the due process clause.
A. Supremacy Clause
Because Congress did not intend to preempt state takeover regula-
tion,' 6 the pertinent issues concerning the constitutionality of a state
takeover law under the supremacy clause are whether "compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility" and
whether the state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives" of the Williams Act. I6 The
outcome of a supremacy clause challenge depends largely on a court's
view of the neutrality purpose of the Williams Act. 67 If the United
States Supreme Court could agree on a preemption analysis, no linger-
ing controversy would exist regarding the constitutional status of state
takeover statutes like Florida's. Of course, the resolution of the pre-
emption issue would require the Court to decide whether neutrality is
an independent objective of the Williams Act, which a majority of the
Court has been unable to do, 16 and to examine the effect of state regu-
lation on that objective. If a majority of the Court ever adopts the
neutrality theory expressed by Justice White in MITE,6 9 the Florida
statute would be unconstitutional under the supremacy clause. Given
164. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Commerce, H.B. 358 (1987) Staff Analysis 5 (final June
22, 1987) (on file with committee).
165. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
166. Id. (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
167. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
168. Compare Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
169. MITE, 457 U.S. at 633-34 (plurality).
AFFILIATED TRANSACTIONS
the current state of the law, a court probably would rule that the Wil-
liams Act does not preempt the Florida statute.
The statute does not regulate the tender offer process or restrict a
tender offeror's freedom to acquire shares; rather, it restricts a tender
offeror's actions after purchase of a statutorily prescribed percentage
of shares in a corporation covered by the statute. While the Williams
Act regulates aspects of the tender offer process such as timing, disclo-
sure, and pro-rata purchases, the Florida statute, like the Indiana stat-
ute upheld in CTS, leaves the tender offer process alone but reduces
the anticipated benefits that accrue from acquiring the shares. Thus,
compliance with both the Williams Act and the Florida Affiliated
Transactions Statute is not a physical impossibility.
An inquiry into whether the statute is "an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of the
Williams Act must begin with an articulation of the "full purposes and
objectives" of the Williams Act. Courts that have considered suprem-
acy clause challenges to state takeover laws have not uniformly articu-
lated the purpose of the Williams Act. The United States District
Court for Nevada held that a Nevada takeover statute violated the su-
premacy clause because it "frustrate[d] the objective of neutrality un-
der the Williams Act.' 170 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, on the other hand, has stated:
The conclusion appears inescapable to this court that a majority of
the [United States Supreme] Court now views the purpose of the
Williams Act, not as a guarantee of a level playing field for offeror
and management in the takeover game, although that level playing
field must be regarded as a means toward achieving the Act's real
purpose, but as protection for the investor while management and
offeror are on the field.' 71
These disparate holdings indicate the lingering controversy caused by
Justice White's plurality opinion in MITE, which suggests that neutral-
ity is an independent objective of the Williams Act. 172 However, a ma-
jority of the Court has clearly stated in other contexts that the "sole
purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who are
confronted with a tender offer' ' 71 and that "[n]eutrality is ... but one
170. Batus, Inc. v. McKay, 684 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D. Nev. 1988) (emphasis added) (holding
unconstitutional NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.3772(1) (1986)).
171. Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
172. MITE, 457 U.S. at 633-34; see also CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645 (explicitly stating that the
Court is not bound by the reasoning of the plurality opinion in MITE).
173. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
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characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the
protection of investors.' 7 4
Thus, a state law that does not frustrate the investor protection ob-
jective of the Williams Act is not preempted by the supremacy clause
merely because it affects the balance between tender offerors and man-
agement that the Williams Act enacted. In the words of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, "[t]o say that Con-
gress wanted to be neutral between bidder and target-a conclusion
reached in many of the Court's opinions-is not to say that it also
forbade the states to favor one of these sides.' '1 75 The Florida Affili-
ated Transactions Statute arguably furthers the investor protection
goals of the Williams Act by reducing the coercive aspects of tender
offers. Because Florida's statute thus cannot be said to conflict with
the goals of the Williams Act, the statute's effect on the balance be-
tween tender offerors and management is immaterial to its constitu-
tionality under the supremacy clause. Therefore, the statute is not
preempted by the Williams Act.
B. Commerce Clause
A statute violates the commerce clause if it discriminates against in-
terstate commerce,' 7 6 adversely "affect[s] interstate commerce. by sub-
jecting activities to inconsistent regulations,"'' 77 or imposes a more
than incidental burden on interstate commerce that is "clearly exces-
sive in relation to the putative local benefits.' '1 78 Under CTS, the Flor-
ida Affiliated Transactions Statute appears constitutional as applied to
Florida corporations, unless a court would make the distinction not
present in Amanda-that is, the distinction between control share ac-
quisition statutes and business combination statutes. However, the
statute as applied to foreign corporations has been held violative of the
commerce clause. 179
174. Id. at 29.
175. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Piper, 430 U.S. at 1).
176. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980); Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (cited in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987)).
177. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liq-
uor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
178. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
179. Grand Metro. P.L.C. v. Butterworth, Civ. A. No. 88-40317WS, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Fla.
Nov. 28, 1988).
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1. Domestic Corporations
As applied to domestic corporations, the statute, like the Indiana
statute upheld in CTS, neither discriminates against interstate com-
merce nor subjects interstate activities to inconsistent regulations. Be-
cause nothing in the Florida statute imposes a greater burden on out-
of-state offerors than it does on Florida offerors, the statute does not
discriminate against interstate commerce.8 0 Likewise, because "[s]o
long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has
created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
State,"' 8 the Florida statute as applied to domestic corporations does
not create a risk of inconsistent regulation by different states.
Determining whether the burdens imposed by the Florida statute are
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits" requires
identification of those benefits or interests. In CTS, the Court identi-
fied internal affairs regulation and shareholder protection as legitimate
interests served by the statute in that case.' 82 This rationale appears to
apply to section 607.108 as well, particularly in light of Amanda. The
statute impedes two-tier, front-end loaded tender offers and permits
shareholders to deliberate collectively regarding the merits of an affili-
ated transaction. These local benefits are identical to those approved in
CTS. 8 3
CTS affirms the right of each state to regulate the corporate gover-
nance of its domestic corporations and establishes that voting rights
are a matter of corporate governance.'14 The statute as applied to Flor-
ida corporations conforms to the CTS constitutional mold because it
simply requires a specified vote of particular directors or shareholders
as a prerequisite to effecting certain corporate transactions. Further-
more, the affiliated transactions statute arguably does not differ from
other provisions of Florida corporate law that require shareholder ap-
proval of a merger, a consolidation, a dissolution, or a sale, lease, ex-
change, or other disposition of all or substantially all of a Florida
corporation's assets. 85 This analysis, however, disregards the policy
reasons for invoking shareholder suffrage rights with respect to funda-
mental organic changes in a corporation.' s6
180. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649-52.
181. Id. at 1649.
182. Id. at 1651-52. The Court's decision in CTS has been criticized for "embedding ... the
state-of-incorporation version of the internal affairs doctrine in the Constitution via the dormant
Commerce Clause." Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doc-
trine in Corporate Law, 75 CAIH. L. REv. 29, 54 (1987).
183. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
184. Id. at 1650-52.
185. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.221, .241, .257 (1989).
186. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
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2. Foreign Corporations
The Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute as applied to foreign
corporations has been held invalid because it "create[s] the risk of in-
consistent regulation, which is an intolerable burden on interstate com-
merce. 11' 7 The statute as applied to foreign corporations might also
fail the Pike balancing test because it "purport[s] to regulate the inter-
nal affairs of out-of-state corporations even though Florida has no le-
gally recognizable interest in doing so";""8 recall that one state interest
identified in CTS was that of regulating the internal affairs of corpora-
tions the state creates. Moreover, the statute as applied to foreign cor-
porations directly affects corporate transactions that may occur
entirely outside of Florida, and is thus unconstitutional because "[t]he
Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state statute to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State." 8 9
Section 607.110, which extends the affiliated transactions statute to
certain foreign corporations, contains a "savings clause,"' 19 which ap-
parently is intended to mitigate the statute's vulnerability to invalida-
tion under the commerce clause as posing a risk of inconsistent state
regulation. The savings clause provides that the affiliated transactions
statute does not apply to a foreign corporation if the law of its state of
incorporation is "expressly inconsistent" with provisions of the statute
applicable to foreign corporations.' 9' Federal courts, however, have
uniformly ruled that savings clauses are ineffective to cure the uncon-
stitutionality of state takeover laws that otherwise subject a foreign
corporation to a risk of inconsistent regulation by different states.' 92
With regard to Florida's savings clause, it has been noted that the affil-
iated transactions statute
might be consistent with the laws of the state of incorporation yet
inconsistent with the laws of other states also attempting to regulate
tender offers involving foreign corporations. In such a case, Florida's
187. Grand Metro., P.L.C. v. Butterworth, Civ. A. No. 88-40317WS, slip op. at 14 (Nov. 29,
1988).
188. Id.
189. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
zona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945)).
190. FLA. STAT. § 607.110(3) (1989).
191. Id.
192. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989); Grand Metro., P.L.C. v.
Butterworth, Civ. A. No. 88-40317WS (Nov. 29, 1988); see supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
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"savings clause" would not help to shield a target corporation from
the inconsistent regulations of an untold number of states.193
The statute as applied to foreign corporations is void under the com-
merce clause.
C. Full Faith and Credit Clause and Due Process Clause
The statute as applied to foreign corporations is also subject to at-
tack under the full faith and credit clause and the due process clause.194
The United States Supreme Court originally interpreted the full faith
and credit clause to require application of the law of the state of incor-
poration to resolve issues involving the internal affairs of a
corporation 95 and treated the clause as a constitutional conflict-of-law
rule. Beginning with Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident
193. Grand Metro, Civ. A. No. 88-40317WS, slip op. at 15. Nevertheless, savings clauses are
considered by Florida courts on the issue of severability. Usually, courts will sever a constitution-
ally invalid provision based on the assumption that the legislature would have enacted the law
without the invalid provision. Barndollar v. Sunset Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979).
Thus, the constitutionally permissible portions of the Act may be severed from the invalid portion
and given effect.
194. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State .... ). This argument, that appli-
cation to foreigii corporations has constitutional implications besides those under the commerce
clause, was made in Grand Metro, Civ. A. No. 88-40317WS, slip op. at 15; the court's references
to the due process clause and to the full faith and credit clause both go to this argument. The
plaintiffs in that case did not make any due process argument based on deprivation of property
rights, i.e., that shareholders deprived of the right to sell their shares in affected two-step acquisi-
tions had suffered a taking. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Grand Metro, Civ. A. No. 88-40317WS.
The due process argument involved in Kidwell was very different: that argument was premised
on the anti-delegation doctrine. The plaintiffs argued that the state had unlawfully delegated the
decision to invoke the statute's protection to private citizens-that is, management. The court
stated that this doctrine had been eroded and that in any event state-law fiduciary duties offered
adequate guidance for making any decisions that had been delegated. Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1287 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
Professors Butler and Ribstein have argued that because corporations can be seen as a set of
contracts among shareholders, managers, creditors, and others, state anti-takeover laws raise con-
tract clause issues as well. Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract
Clause, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 611 (1988).
195. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (full
faith and credit clause requires court of forum state to apply the law of the state of incorpora-
tion); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (residents of New Jersey who are shareholders of
a company incorporated in New York submit themselves to the law and jurisdiction of New
York); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912) (Wisconsin court must apply Minnesota law to
suit involving Minnesota corporation).
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Commission,' " however, courts increasingly have deferred to the law
of the forum state. The United States Supreme Court has enunciated a
modern rule regarding the application of the full faith and credit
clause:
[Iln view of the fact that the forum state is also a sovereign in its own
right, in appropriate cases it may attach paramount importance to its
own legitimate interests. Accordingly, the fact that a choice-of-law
decision may be unsound as a matter of conflicts law does not
necessarily implicate the federal concerns embodied in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Rather, .. . the Clause should not invalidate a
state court's choice of forum unless that choice threatens the federal
interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the
legitimate interests of another State. '97
This rule usually results in courts validating the application of the fo-
rum state's law.'" Accordingly, the full faith and credit clause should
not prohibit Florida from applying the statute to a foreign corporation
if a sufficient relationship exists between Florida and the foreign cor-
poration. This issue was not present in CTS because the Indiana law
did not apply to foreign corporations. Nor was it addressed in MITE
or in subsequent lower court opinions concerning state takeover laws
that apply to foreign corporations. Nevertheless, the jurisdictional
nexus with Florida necessary to subject a foreign corporation to the
affiliated transaction statute should be sufficient to defeat a challenge
on the grounds of the full faith and credit clause.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Section 607.108, Florida Statutes, is disguised as regulating only the
internal affairs of Florida corporations and foreign corporations hav-
ing a substantial nexus with Florida. In reality, however, it is designed
to impede two-step takeovers in which shareholders receive less per
share in the second step than in the first. The broader statutory scheme
is designed to impede takeovers in general. Even if section 607.108 is
196. 294 U.S. 532 (1935). In Alaska Packers, the Court held that:
Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts it own statutes, lawfully
enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting stat-
ute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing
... that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to
those of the forum.
Id. at 547-48.
197. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
198. See Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 440, 442 (1982).
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constitutional, the question whether it is sound policy persists. Should
Florida discourage control transfers between willing buyers and sellers
to protect local industry or should it leave those individual economic
decisions to the parties involved?
John Coffee has offered four hypotheses to explain why acquirers
are willing to pay substantially more than market value for the shares
of a corporation. The difference between market value and offering
price may represent: (1) gain from replacing incompetent management,
(2) gain from moving resources to more productive use, (3) gain from
"synergy"-that is, the value of a new corporation is greater than the
sum of the values of two corporations from which it was formed, or
(4) the premium that the acquirer is willing to pay to serve its own
inefficient "empire-building" ambitions.199 The first three theories are
really variations of the same one: acquirers are willing to pay more
because it is possible to manage the corporation more efficiently than
current management is doing. 200 The last theory seems less credible: an
acquirer who places "empire building" ahead of efficiency may soon
itself become the target of efficiency-oriented acquirers. 20' Thus, takeo-
ver activity seems to represent at least perceived efficiency gains.2°2
However, even if these efficiency gains are real, wealth-transfer and
other effects must be evaluated independently. If a target is worth
more in the hands of an acquirer, the acquirer could pay exactly pres-
ent market value for shares and keep 100% of the efficiency gain, or
could pay so much for shares that tendering shareholders keep
100%. 2o3 The "investor protection" rationale behind federal and state
takeover regulation is concerned with this potential wealth transfer be-
tween tendering shareholders and acquirers, and section 607.108 per-
199. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1162-73 (1984).
200. However, Professor Coffee's trifurcation of this theory does make an important point:
bumbling incumbent management is not the only source of corporate inefficiency. For example,
the acquirer may be taking advantage of economies of scale by merging the target into a larger
operation. See also Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (corporation with tax credits
but no taxable income merging with corporation with taxable income but no tax credits).
201. See Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeover, 76 AM.
EcoN. REv. 323, 323-24 (1986).
202. Of course, an acquirer may be wrong in its perception of its ability to make efficiency
gains, and pay (and probably borrow) more than the target is actually worth. If so, this represents
a wealth transfer to tendering shareholders who sold at the excessive tender offer price, from the
acquirer and those from whom it borrows to make the acquisition. This hardly seems to justify
anti-takeover legislation, which views tendering shareholders as potential victims.
203. Arguably, the acquirer should keep 100016 of the gain, because that will cause more tak-
eovers to be successfully completed, and thus there will be more total efficiency gain. According
to this theory, there is no wealth transfer component to consider at all, because shareholders
whose holdings are adequately diversified own shares in both targets and acquirers, and thus keep
100% of the gain either way. See Banoff, supra note 95, at 300.
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ceives "front-end loaded" tender offers as coercing target shareholders
into making this transfer.204
Other wealth transfers may be involved as well. For example, effi-
ciency gains may be available by relocating corporate operations to an-
other, more appropriate location. Relocation is efficient if the loss to
employees, businesses, and the community in general in the old loca-
tion is less than gains to other persons, including employees, busi-
nesses, and the community in general in the new location. But the
"losers" in the old location are unlikely to favor this transfer simply
because they understand that it results in a net efficiency gain.25 Thus,
one objective of state anti-takeover legislation is simply protectionism.
Indeed, the staff analyses of the 1987 act that contained Florida's con-
trol share acquisition and affiliated transaction statutes flatly state that
the legislative purpose is to protect Florida industry.3
Moreover, the mechanism for achieving the protectionism objective
is to provide advantages to incumbent management: after all, manage-
ment decides where to incorporate and do business, and managers do
not like to lose their jobs, even if a takeover is in the best interest of
the shareholders. Protecting shareholders against extremely coercive
two-tier offers which offer a choice between a low average per-share
204. But, of course, if the average price per share received in the two steps of the takeover is
at least equal to the previous per-share value, tenderors have transferred only the efficiency gain
and not any of the value they previously held. Thus, the two-step tender offer in which the aver-
age per-share price received is exactly equal to the previous per-share value appears to be the ideal
one under the "holdout coercion" and "diversification" theories. See supra notes 95 & 203.
205. Justice Powell, concurring in MITE, noted this concern:
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations tend
to be located in the large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters are trans-
ferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and
locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Management
personnel-many of whom have provided community leadership-may move to the
new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educational
life-both in terms of leadership and financial support-also tend to diminish when
there is a move of corporate headquarters.
MITE, 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
206. The Senate staff analysis states:
The intent of this bill is to protect Florida corporations from hostile takeovers .... By
offering a safe haven where Florida corporations cannot be easily subjected to hostile
takeovers, corporations will be more attracted to Florida when deciding where, among
other states, to locate.
Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., HB 358 (1987) Staff Analysis 3 (rev. May 26, 1987)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 1628, Tallahassee, Fla.).
The House staff analysis states:
[I]t is believed that the proposed leglsation will create a disincentive for existing Florida
corporations to reincorporate in other states, while attracting foreign corporations to
reincorporate in Florida.
Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Commerce, HB 358 (1987) Staff Analysis 3-4 (April 24, 1987)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton 1737, Tallahassee, Fla.).
AFFILIATED TRANSACTIONS
price or an even lower second-step price may be a desirable policy goal,
but management entrenchment is not. In this respect, section 607.108
makes choices that are not the proper province of the legislature. Cor-
porations are fueled by capital, and capital is driven by shareholders.
Those with the greatest stake in the outcome historically have been free
to exercise corporate control within the limits of fiduciary responsibil-
ity. The principal tool of corporate control is the right to vote, select
management, and influence fundamental corporate decisions. Govern-
ment should not interfere with the lawful choices of those whose capi-
tal is at risk.
Moreover, the "fair price" requirements of the statute effectively
deprive controlling shareholders of the judicially recognized "control
premium" value of their shares.Y If acquirers are forced to pay the
same price to every shareholder, they will spread the "control pre-
mium" across the per share price rather than paying it only to those
shareholders who possess control. Thus, one ultimate effect of the stat-
ute is to remove control and the premium it commands from majority
shareholders and give it to management and minority shareholders.
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to make individual in-
vestment decisions concerning a tender offer, because offers will be
conditioned on shareholder or management approval of the second
step of the acquisition. Shareholders are deprived of their right to vote
on a merger2 that constitutes a second step unless the approval re-
quired by section 607.108 is also secured.2 Moreover, incumbent man-
agement has an inherent conflict of interest in evaluating takeover
efforts because officers and directors do not want to lose their jobs;
this conflict is tempered only by state-law fiduciary duties. This is not
corporate governance, but management entrenchment and the antithe-
sis of corporate democracy. Thus, "protection" by the provisions of
section 607.108 may not be in shareholders' best interests. The "opt-
out" provisions, given their inherent delay and management's ability
to resist opting out,210 do not adequately address this concern.
V. LESS RESTRICTIVE APPROACHES
Even if the statute's purposes are sound policy, a less restrictive ap-
proach is possible. First, the five-year holding period and its limitation
207. See Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 421 N.Y.S.2d 877, 397 N.E.2d 387
(1979).
208. FLA. STAT. § 607.221 (1989).
209. The approval required by section 607.108 is in addition to any other approval required
by law. Id. § 607.108(2) (1989).
210. See FLA. STAT. § 607.108(5) (1989).
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to eighty percent shareholders seems harsh. 1' Additionally, the statute
should state in plain language that it is directed toward two-step tak-
eovers. As currently written, the statute prohibits transactions with
shareholders who have engaged in neither the first nor second step of a
takeover. Finally, to eliminate uncertainty the definitions in the statute
should conform as much as possible to those in federal securities law.
A better statute might read as follows:
Acquisition Transactions. No person or group may acquire a
corporation if the acquisition occurs within two years after the
commencement of a tender offer by that person or group in which the
per share value of the cash and other consideration received by the
tendering shareholders exceeds the per share value of the cash and
other consideration received by the corporation or its remaining
shareholders in the acquisition.
Definitions. As used in this section, the terms defined below have
the respective meanings ascribed to them:
"Acquisition of a corporation" means the acquisition, directly or
indirectly, of a corporation, all its outstanding voting stock, or all or
substantially all its assets pursuant to a merger, tender offer,
consolidation, liquidation, recapitalization, stock purchase, stock
redemption, reverse stock split, a sale or exchange of a corporation's
assets, or any combination of the foregoing transactions;
"Person" means a trust, estate, partnership, corporation,
association, cooperative, joint venture, business trust, or limited
liability company, as well as a natural person;
"Group" means two or more persons who agree to act in concert
with respect to a tender offer or an ensuing acquisition, and includes
with respect to any particular person the spouse and every relative of
the person, any relative of the person's spouse who has the same
home as the person, and every other person who, directly or
indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled
by, or is under common control with, that person;
"Tender offer" has the same meaning that is judicially ascribed to
that term as used in section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988).
Per Share Value. For purposes of this section, the value of all
noncash consideration received by a corporation or a shareholder will
be its aggregate market value, and the per share value received by a
corporation will be determined by dividing its total number of
211. See id. § 607.108(4)(c).
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outstanding shares, excluding all shares having a specified liquidation
or redemption value, into the aggregate value of all cash and other
consideration received by the corporation, after deducting the amount
of any accumulated dividend preferences and the aggregate
liquidation or redemption value of all capital stock having a specified
liquidation or redemption value, whether or not any consideration
received by the corporation is paid or distributed to its shareholders
in connection with an acquisition. If both the corporation and any of
its shareholders receive cash or other consideration in connection with
an acquisition, whether the acquisition is prohibited will be
determined by the per share value received by the corporation, and
the per share value received by the corporation will be calculated by
adding the aggregate value of all cash and other consideration
received by the shareholders to the aggregate value of all cash and
other consideration received by the corporation and by treating as still
outstanding any shares redeemed, cancelled, converted, or otherwise
extinguished in exchange or substitution for the consideration
received by the shareholders.
Exemptions. Nominal differences between the per share value
received by shareholders in a tender offer and the per share value
received by the corporation or its remaining shareholders in a
subsequent acquisition will not by itself cause an acquisition to be
prohibited. In addition, an acquisition that is subject to this section
will not be prohibited, regardless of the per share value received by
the corporation or its shareholders pursuant to it, if the acquisition is
approved in advance by the affirmative vote or written consent of the
holders of a majority of the outstanding voting shares of the
corporation, excluding all shares tendered pursuant to the tender
offer that preceded the acquisition (regardless of who then owns
them) and either all shares that are beneficially owned by the person
or group that made the tender offer, or, if the person or group
making the acquisition is not the same person or group that made the
tender offer, any shares that are beneficially owned by the person or
group that is making the acquisition and that previously were
beneficially owned by the person or group who made the tender offer
at any time on or after the commencement of the tender offer.
Successors in Interest. This section applies to an acquisition of a
corporation by a person or group that occurs within two years after
the commencement of a tender offer by a different person or group,
if the person or group making the acquisition beneficially owns, as of
either the date when the acquisition is approved by the corporation's
shareholders or the date when the acquisition is effective, more than
fifty percent of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation,
excluding any shares acquired or to be acquired pursuant to the
acquisition, and acquired from the person or group who made the
tender offer, directly or indirectly through one or more
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intermediaries, after the commencement of the tender offer,
beneficial ownership of an amount of voting shares that resulted in
the total number of voting shares beneficially owned by the person or
group making the acquisition exceeding fifty percent of the
outstanding voting shares of the corporation.
To assure shareholders the right "to deliberate collectively" about the
merits of an acquisition, the Florida Legislature could enact a law per-
mitting shareholders to approve a plan of merger or consolidation or
for the sale or exchange of all or substantially all of a corporation's
assets without the prior approval of the plan by the corporation's
board of directors. This would preclude management from preempting
the shareholders' opportunity to consider the merits of an acquisition.
The Florida General Corporation Act permits a special meeting of
shareholders to be called by shareholders owning at least ten percent of
all the shares entitled to vote at the meeting. 21 2 However, the Act also
requires, as a prerequisite to shareholder approval of a merger, consol-
idation, or sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substan-
tially all of a corporation's assets, that the board of directors adopt a
resolution recommending the transaction and submit it to a vote at a
shareholders' meeting. 23 Thus, current law enables a board of direc-
tors acting in its self-interest in entrenchment to deny shareholders the
opportunity to consider an acquisition offer by merely refraining from
adopting the required statutory resolution.
In fact, this is the reason that takeover offers are increasingly cast as
tender offers: a tender offer allows a takeover bidder to submit its ac-
quisition offer for shareholder deliberation when management opposes
the offer. If Florida is to continue to regulate tender offers, bidders
should be able to submit their acquisition offers for shareholder con-
sideration if a sufficient number of shareholders are interested in the
offer to call a special meeting for the purpose of acting on it.
These changes would achieve the purpose of restricting "front-end
loaded" tender offers without infringing on transactions in interstate
commerce or serving the local protectionism objective of the affiliated
transactions statute. Protection of shareholders does not require prohi-
bition of other transactions which are "affiliated transactions" within
the meaning of section 607.108. Shareholders are adequately protected
against self-dealing by state-law fiduciary duty, statutory appraisal
rights, 214 and perhaps even federal securities anti-fraud provisions. 215
212. Id. § 607.084(3)(b).
213. Id.§607.2141,.221,.241.
214. Id. § 607.247.
215. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977). This strained opinion was
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VI. GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTE
A corporation that is subject to section 607.108 should decide
whether it desires the statute's protection. This decision will depend on
the corporation's existing takeover posture and future objectives.
Some corporations might already have effective takeover deterrents,
such as classified stock, cumulative voting, staggered directors, or poi-
son pills. Corporations are also already protected by the control-share
acquisition statute. 2 6 In addition, some corporations might favor being
acquired for sufficient value, and might therefore might want to utilize
the opt-out provisions to facilitate friendly takeovers. However, any
election to opt out of the statute is not effective for eighteen months. 21 7
Acquirer strategies are somewhat limited. Of course, transactions
with less-than-ten-percent shareholders are not regulated, but with that
small degree of control, hostile acquirers will be unable to effect the
transaction. The only effective acquirer strategy is to condition the
tender offer on the approval of the second step required by the statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Florida Affiliated Transactions Statute is a thinly veiled attempt
by the Florida Legislature to protect local industries. Its application to
foreign corporations is almost certainly unconstitutional under the
commerce clause; additionally, while the Supreme Court has validated
one control share acquisition statute, business combination statutes are
substantially more pro-management. Moreover, its protectionism and
management entrenchment aspects and its interference with efficiency
goals appear to be poor public policy.
Given the remoteness of the possibility of definitively preemptive
federal legislation, the only threat to the statute is partial invalidation
by the courts or repeal by the legislature. Until then, the statute im-
poses a substantial burden on Florida takeover activity.
215. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977). This strained opinion was
written in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision that garden-variety self-dealing does not
constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989), absent fraud or misrepresenta-
tion by the self-dealing directors. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Second
Circuit read Santa Fe as not completely foreclosing a lOb-5 action for corporate mismanagement,
and went on to answer the intriguing question of how a corporation can be deceived and what the
appropriate standard of materiality is. Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 214-21.
216. FLA. STAT. § 607.109 (1989).
217. Id. § 607.108(5).
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